The author argues that experiences are complex events that befall their subjects.
Some might be interested in this question for the same reason that historians of ideas are interested in drawing out consequences of unlikely doctrines in Plotinus or Leibniz.
Others might be more sympathetic to the possibility that experiences don't represent, but want to have certain doubts resolved. For example, they might worry that a nonrepresentational account of experiences can't explain how experiences justify beliefs. For such readers, my project might serve as proof of concept. More optimistically, my account of experiences as non-representational events might be so attractive that it helps justify the doctrine that experiences don't represent. I am myself convinced that experiences (ordinarily so-called) do not represent, 2 and what follows is my best attempt to give a positive account of what they actually are. In the first part of the paper, I'll say something about the metaphysical structure of experiences. In the second part, I'll say something about where and when they occur.
Participants

Experiences as Events
Events are often distinguished from ordinary objects by their relation to time. I am entirely present in the room. My life is not. Though every part of me is in this room, most parts of my life are not. Qualities and states seem to inherit the relation to time of the substances in which they inhere. If I am entirely present in a room, then so is my stature and my grumpiness.
Experiences stretch out over time. Your experience of reading this paper, for example, might last about twenty minutes. Experiences are never wholly present to the mind commentators. I've had useful conversations on the subject with many people, including Fiona Cowie, Janet Levin, and David Owen. 2 I give my arguments in Jacovides (2010) .
at a time, except insofar as we remember them, not unless the experience is very brief. You only get to read a little bit of this paper at a time, however much you might want to get it all in an instant. Long experiences unfold; they occur over stages. Each experience constitutes, in Ryle's phrase (103) , "a sub-stretch of my life-story." I conclude, with Charles Siewert (11),
Brian O'Shaughnessy (42), and Alex Byrne ( §2.1), that experiences are events. Michael Tye (332) writes, "Token experiences are events (in the broad sense, which includes token states)". I would go so far as to say that they are events in the narrow sense that excludes states. States, unlike experiences, are present all at once.
This way of distinguishing between events and objects is controversial. Sider (1997) challenges the intelligibility of the distinction. Hawthorne's explanations (2008) don't seem to capture its spirit. Fine's attempt (2006) seems better and true, but perhaps doesn't get at the heart of the matter. If it turns out that there's nothing to the distinction between events and enduring objects, my paper might still have some value. I will have given a description of an unusually interesting sort of space-time worm.
That experiences are events is perhaps the first fact about experiences, and everything else that one says about the subject should be compatible with it. I suspect that when philosophers fail to find intrinsic qualities of experiences, the problem often is that they are barking up the wrong categories. In an important paper, Gilbert Harman argues,
When you attend to a pain in your leg or to your experience of the redness of an apple, you are attending to a quality of an occurrence in your leg or a quality of the apple. Perhaps this quality is presented to you as an intrinsic quality in your leg or as an intrinsic quality of the surface of the apple. But it is not at all presented as an intrinsic quality of your experience (41).
True enough, but pain is a sensation and not a quality. The relevant quality here, I would have thought, is being painful. Surely, the experience of having a pain in your leg is intrinsically and essentially painful. The experience is painful because the pain is painful, and the pain is part of the experience. It's obvious to the sufferer that the experience is painful, so the experience is presented as painful.
Red is a quality, but not a quality that most events can have. Explosions and flashes may be exceptions, but they are unusual events that seem to lack substrata. The fact that experiences can't be red just goes to show that experiences are ordinary events in this regard.
A party can't be red, not even a party at a firehouse where all the guests wear red pants. In order to investigate the intrinsic qualities of experiences, we ought to examine qualities that ordinary events can bear. Parties can last until three in the morning. Parties can be drunken, exciting, or enjoyable. Can experiences last until three in the morning? Can they be drunken, exciting, or enjoyable? Yes, of course.
Almost all events depend on at least one enduring object. Explosions and flashes again might be counter-examples, but I'll set them aside. Most events are complex in that they depend on more than one enduring object. 3 These involved objects are agents from which the event arises, patients which the events befall, or neither agents nor patients, but nevertheless participants in the event. The officiant is an agent in a wedding. The bride and groom are both agents and patients. The surroundings and the guests participate in one way or another.
Peter Simons asserts, "no occurrent is part of a continuant and no continuant is ever part of an occurrent" (306). I don't think that we have any sufficient reason to believe this.
Perhaps Simons is worried about fending off the fallacious inference from A is part of B and
B is an occurrent to A is an occurrent, as if playing in a hockey game would make you divisible into three periods. This may just be a linguistic dispute, since 'part' is said in many ways. At the very least, hockey players take part in hockey games. Simons refers to the participation relation that I have in mind with the vague word 'involving ' (130n3, ).
I'll use 'participant' for the relation that holds between ordinary objects and the events they are involved in and 'constituent' as a generic term for participation, parthood, membership and the like.
In this paper, I'll describe the conditions of unity and participation for experiences.
As a consequence of this account, it will turn out that almost all experiences are complex events. The spirit behind my project is the same one that guided Barry Smith's analysis of perceptions as 'relational acts' that are "formally indistinguishable from relational actions and events such as promisings, fights, thefts, conversations, kissings, hittings, weddings, greetings, and so forth" (173). I won't appeal to any particular analysis of perception or introspection, however. Instead, I'll treat x is aware of y as a primitive relation that human beings can stand in with respect to external and internal objects and offer an account of experiences that depends on that relation.
Subjects of Experiences
The primary participant in every experience is always the person who has it. Experiences depend on awareness, and awareness requires a conscious living subject who is aware. Thus, on any reasonable account, an experience will happen to at least one subject.
Strictly speaking, an experience will happen to at most one subject. We do talk about shared experiences, and I take such locutions seriously. In the end, however, I think that shared experiences are, at most, higher order complex events that overlap the more basic personal experiences. If Jack and Jill walk up a hill they share an experience. Even so, Jack's experience might be pleasant while Jill's is unpleasant. I infer that Jack's experience is, at some level, a distinct experience from Jill's.
A referee objects to the lesson I draw from Jack and Jill: "here's an alternative construal: their experience might be pleasant to Jack but unpleasant to Jill. This is consistent with its being one experience." I'm not inclined to go that way. It seems to me that being pleasant is an intrinsic feature of experiences, at least at the root level. Since being intrinsically pleasant is incompatible with being intrinsically painful for basic experiences, Jack and Jill can't be having the very same basic experiences, though we might try to construct collective experiences out of their individual ones.
There are degrees of commonality in experience and the proper analysis of these degrees might require appeal to particular facts about particular objects, events, or occasions.
If Jack and Jill walk up a hill at the same time, they share an experience in a stronger sense than if they walk up the hill on different days or if they walk up different hills. Even in the cleanest and best examples of shared experiences, however, there will always be a difference in perspective and affect, and, thus each basic experience will happen to at most one subject.
Grounding Events and Grounding States
We should be careful to distinguish between experiences and what they are of. J. J. C. Smart (150-51) rightly contrasts after-images with the experience of having an after-image. I don't agree with his further, substantive claims (experiences are brain processes and after-images are nothing at all) but the distinction ought to be drawn.
In my treatment, the canonical description of an experience will be "so-and-so's experience of φ" where φ is replaced by an expression for an event or a state and where soand-so is the subject of the experience. Descriptions where φ is replaced with an expression for an ordinary object are, I think, elliptical for descriptions in my canonical form. If experiences represented their grounding events, we would expect some of them to represent non-occurring grounding events.
The experience of being in a car wreck might leave its subject bruised and frightened.
The experience of sliding down a hill in a sled might leave its subject giddy and cold. The experience of chasing a sparrow out of the house might leave its subject sweaty and pleased.
I think that the following sentence expresses a truth: "Alumni who played football in universities tend not to donate money, because they've usually been injured by their experiences on the field." On the view that experiences are strictly mental states, this sentence would turn out to be nonsense. On any view, one might emphasize that it is more than anything the violent contact with other players that causes injuries. Still, I think, 'experiences' is the mot juste in the example. We want to refer to both the physical processes that narrowly cause the injuries and also to the subjective reactions that explain why the alumni do not donate. If we treat playing in a football game as a constituent of the experience of playing in a football game, then we can capture the physical side of that intuition.
Extraneous Participants
A full account of experiences will provide us with a full account of the all the participants in the experience and explain how those participants relate to the subject of the experience.
We aren't done yet, since experiences have participants beyond their subjects and beyond their grounding events and states.
Playing in the championship match at Wimbledon is, I imagine, exhilarating.
Likewise, the experience of playing in the championship match at Wimbledon is exhilarating.
The experience, however, seems to include elements that the match does not. The experience of playing the match may include noticing one's mother in the stands, but playing a tennis match doesn't include noticing one's mother. The players in a game are the participants in the game, while the spectators are on the outside looking in. That's the difference between players and spectators. The mother doesn't participate in the player's match, even though she's part of his experience of the match.
According to J.M. Hinton, the ordinary experience of X-ing "is no other event or or thing than X-ing, the event of which one is the grammatical subject" (6). If some experiences include elements that don't participate in the grounding events of those experiences, then Hinton is mistaken. Experiences shouldn't be identified with the events that ground them, since they can include more constituents than those grounding events.
Under what conditions do elements beyond subjects and grounding events participate in the subject's experience? According to G.E. Moore, "that peculiar relation which I have called 'awareness of anything' . . . is involved equally in the analysis of every experience" (452). I'll use this insight to construct an approximation of participation in an experience and then refine the approximation in light of counter-examples.
My approximation is that an experience includes not only the grounding event or state but also everything that the subject of the experience is aware of while the grounding event or state takes place. If Smith is aware of the buzzing of a fly while she takes an exam, then her experience of taking the exam includes the buzzing of the fly. This is so even though the buzzing of the fly is no part of her taking the exam. On this account, experiences are richer in some respects than their grounding events or states. Anything that one can be conscious of can be included in an experience, including rattles, buzzings, smells, moods, pains, tingles, the visual field, decisions, changes of heart, and revelations.
The present account, however, seems to let too much in. Suppose that I've been in an accident and injured both my ankles at the same time and that they heal at the same rate.
One might think that defenders of this account are committed to saying that the experience Even if someone were willing to bite the bullet on this example, the account comes to grief with long experiences that aren't central to one's life. Consider the experience of being allergic to cats. Surely, if someone asks another person about this experience, she doesn't want to hear the complete life story of everything that the allergic person has been aware of since discovering his allergy. Some sort of relevance condition needs to be imposed.
The problem with the approximate account is connected to a point that Dewey made: some things that we are aware of don't hang together as a single experience.
"Oftentimes," he writes, "things are experienced, but not in such a way that they are composed into an experience" (1958 35 we desire and what we get, are at odds with each other. We put up our hands to the plow and turn back; we start and then we stop, not because the experience has reached the end for the sake of which it was initiated but because of extraneous interruptions or of inner lethargy (ibid.).
He contrasts this undifferentiated mass of experience with particular, unified experiences:
In contrast with such experience, we have an experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment. Then and then only is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experiences. A piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its solution; a game is played through; a situation, whether that of eating a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking part in a political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience (ibid.).
His conclusion is that only events that come to a satisfactory conclusion make up an experience.
It seems to me that Dewey's examples do not support his conclusion. Experiences can be incomplete, unsatisfying, and crummy. The experience of making a shoddy birdhouse, of struggling fruitlessly with a problem, and of playing an interrupted game of chess are all genuine individual experiences.
I don't want to make too much of this. Dewey is pretty clearly talking about a particular and idiosyncratic notion of experience. On the next page, he uses the expression "experience in this vital sense", and I do not want to fight over words. Moreover, he is plainly on to something. Consider everything that you were conscious of between 10:20 a.m. The examples of the storm and the ruptured friendship show that, even by Dewey's own lights, the satisfactoriness and success of the grounding event or state aren't necessary conditions for the objects of awareness to coalesce into an experience. He is on firmer ground when he suggests that narrative unity is a precondition for particular experiences.
Ordinary speech, he tells us, picks out particular experiences, because life "is a thing of histories, each with its own plot, its own inception and movement toward its close, each having its own particular rhythmic movement" (1958 35-36 an enduring thing can be an object of awareness (or the substratum of an object of awareness) and relevant to telling the story of what it was like for the subject to undergo the grounding event or state. These are the participants in an experience.
Inner Objects and Illusory Objects
From this account of the constituents of experiences, it follows that our experience of having a mental state ought not be identified with the mental state itself. Suppose that I'm delivering a talk and I have a stabbing pain in the belly. The pain is so great that I collapse to the floor, and members of the audience gather around to see if anything can be done. An ambulance is summoned, and I am brought to the hospital. My falling to the ground, the concerned faces of the on-lookers, and the trip to the hospital are all parts of my experience of having a stabbing pain in the belly, assuming that I don't pass out. Falling to the ground and being taken to the hospital are not, of course, constituents of the pain itself.
It also follows from my account that most experiences are complex events, since most experiences will involve awareness of external objects. There may be exceptional experiences that aren't complex events. At least in principle, some experiences might not involve the awareness of external objects. Certain meditative experiences or the experience of being placed in a sensory deprivation chamber may be actual examples. the experience of feeling depressed on a rainy afternoon. The feeling is a constituent of the experience, but the experience of having the feeling also includes all the other elements that are relevant to telling the story of what it was like to feel depressed at that time and place.
Suppose someone else doesn't want to distinguish elation from the experience of feeling elated at some time and some place. Suppose that a philosopher wants to use 'experience' as a grab bag term that includes feelings, perceptions, and sensations in its extension. So long as my interlocutor is willing to grant that I'm saying interesting things about an ordinary psychological kind, I don't have any substantive complaints if she uses 'experience' in the stipulated sense. To be honest, however, I don't really think that feeling, sensations, and perceptions make for a true natural kind, and I worry that terminology that lumps them together will encourage misleading generalizations from one to the others.
Just as experiences of internal states can include external events, so can experiences of external events include internal states. As I mentioned earlier, Sartwell (69n1) denies that experiences represent. I agree with the spirit of Sartwell's account, but not with some of its details. In particular, it seems to me that he goes too far in sealing off the inner aspects of experience from epistemic access. Sartwell denies, whereas I affirm, that "some aspects of the inner component of experience are epistemically available to the experiencer" (59). 9 Against Travis, Byrne argues that we can also go wrong when something looks a way that it isn't, where the relevant sense of 'looks' is phenomenal and not epistemic or comparative and cannot be reduced to claims about the 'objective look' of the perceived object (Byrne § §4.2-5). Byrne is right about this, I think. There's more to how a thing looks to a person than how that person judges it to be and how the thing objectively looks. Suppose that Audra is on stage in a theater in the round. She looks short to Joan who sees her against the background of taller actors and tall to Sam who sees her against the background of shorter ones. Each knows her objective height which is, let us suppose, perfectly average. Audra, that very woman, is a participant
Locations of Experiences
So much for the constituents of experiences. Let me turn to the places at which experiences occur. I do this partly because it's interesting in its own right but mostly to fend off an obvious objection. There's surely some sense in which experiences occur where the subject is. How is this fact compatible with my thesis that experiences have extra-mental constituents?
Along the same lines, J. J. Valberg worries (140) O'Shaughnessy (16-17, 66) also seems inclined to say that experiences have no spatial location. Siewert (341n1) leaves "it open whether experience is in every case, in some sense, an internal event, and whether we are to say it occurs 'in the mind ' (or 'subject,' or 'soul,' or 'self'), as opposed to taking place 'outside,' 'in the world.'" Though participation in an experience isn't limited to what's in the head, when we ask where an experience occurred, we are asking where the person who underwent the experience was. For example, if Jones gazes at the stars while taking a walk, then the answer to the question 'where did his experience of gazing at the stars occur?' is given by the path in both Sam's and Joan's experiences of attending the play. This is true even though Audra appears tall in Sam's experience and appears short in Joan's experience.
he took during his walk and not by the locations of the stars. P. M. S. Hacker offers the following account of this fact:
Psychological events are essentially changes which persons (or other sentient creatures) undergo, not parts of persons . . . There is nothing imprecise about saying that A's experiencing so-and-so occurred when A was at such and such a place. We could not have reasons for more precise identifications, for we can give no sense to being more precise in this respect (13) (14) .
I want to say that experiences are richer than mere changes in subjects and that they may include external substances as participants. Is this a fatal difficulty for my account?
Locating events has been a vexed problem in metaphysics. Since experiences are events, we should expect the difficulties to translate. Aristotle's view was that activities occur in the thing acted upon: "nor is it strange that the activity of one thing should be in
another. For the teaching activity belongs to the teacher, still it is in someone else-it is not cut off, but is of one thing in another" (Physics 3.3 202b5-8). There are two ways in which an event may take place at the Empire State Building.
The first is from the outside, as with a lightning strike on its rod. The second is on the inside, as when a meeting occurs on the seventy-first floor. Objective or semi-objective experiences are more like lightning strikes than they are like meetings. They are, in this sense, external events.
The fact that experiences are external events solves various puzzles that might otherwise arise from the fact that experiences occur where their subjects are. It solves
Valberg's paradox of how objects can be present to experience even though experiences occur where their subjects are. Likewise, it solves the puzzle of how experiences can be present to a subject while depending on the occurrence of events and states that may lie partially outside the subject. The location of the subject only answers one question about the location of the experience. It doesn't exclude the possibility that the experience might have participants beyond the subject.
Counter-Arguments Rebutted
I should criticize arguments for treating experiences as purely internal events, beginning with some offered by Fred Dretske. 12 First, he argues, they (and thoughts) "have to be in the head (or at least somewhere in the body) if our having them is (sometimes) to explain why we act the way we do" (35). I think this argument is fallacious. In order for an experience to affect an action, perhaps it must affect the agent's brain, but it isn't necessary for it to be inside her head. The most that Dretske's eyelid example could show is that experiences partly depend on the person having the experience. That's true, of course, and is a consequence of my account. Nevertheless, it doesn't follow that experiences are entirely in the head.
Nor is there any ontological benefit in restricting the occurrences of experiences to the boundaries of the cranium. The Tigris River and the tennis player's mother, when seen through the cold and unloving eyes of the reductive materialist, are material objects just as much as any portion of brain tissue.
If somebody takes it the wrong way, it's actually somewhat insulting to be told that one's experiences occurred entirely in the head. The résumé inflator may invent his putative experiences, and Walter Mitty's may be mostly imaginary, but my experiences are genuine. I really did those things; that really happened to me. One way can deny the objective occurrence of an experience is to say that it only occurred in a deluded person's head. Of course, when Dretske says that my experiences only occurred in my head, he doesn't mean it as insult. Nevertheless, the fact that it can be taken that way suggests that there's something fishy about his claim.
Times of Experiences
I'll finish by considering questions of timing. I earlier said that experiences were stretched out over time, and it may clarify matters to be more definite. It seems to me that an experience cannot occur before the grounding event or state has started or after it has halted.
Even though fighting in a war may affect a person for the rest of his life, the experience of fighting in a war must end when the fighting does.
At this point, I run the risk of contradicting myself. Earlier, I said that states occur all at once and events are stretched out over time. Now I say that events last no longer than their grounding events or states. Let me clarify that when I write that an experience cannot occur before a state has started or after it has halted, I mean that an experience can't occur outside the period in which the subject is in the relevant state.
A related worry concerns experiences of accomplishments. What are we to say of 'the experience of reaching the summit of Mt. Everest'? 14 To my ear, to inquire into an experience is to inquire into a stretch of time, and when someone asks about the experience of reaching the summit of Everest, she's looking for a story, the culmination of which is the last few steps. Others might reply that they are interested in how the climber felt at the very instant at which he reached the highest point on Earth.
14 I owe the objection to a referee. When we say that experiences occur when they make a noticeable difference in the subject's life, I would like to add that they need be noticed at the time of their occurrence.
Against this addition, consider Hinton's colorful tale of counter-revolution:
suppose a young man tells you that when he and his friend Peter were conscripts, sent to suppress revolution in a distant former colony, and were taken prisoner, Peter had the experience of being operated on, in a field hospital of the revolutionaries, for the removal of six bullets. Your informant's using the word 'experience' may lead you to assume that they were not able to give Peter a general anaesthetic, but only a local or regional one, or only rice wine, or nothing at all. However, you may be inclined to let the word 'experience' pass even if you are told that Peter did have a general anaesthetic and was completely unconscious throughout the operation-no simultaneous relevant awareness, presumably (9).
I am not, personally, inclined to let this pass. That's partially a matter of linguistic intuition about which people may disagree.
As a matter of metaphysics, however, it doesn't really matter what we call it, since such an experience would just be an ordinary event labeled an 'experience' because of later consequences. And, indeed, this is how Hinton looks at the matter (5-6). If, on the other hand, we are interested in experiences as a metaphysically distinctive sort of event, one partially constructed out of subjective awareness, we should restrict our attention to instances in which Moore's condition holds and in which the experience includes the awareness of something.
To sum up, experiences are complex events that befall their subjects. An experience of a grounding event or state occurs when that event or state makes a difference to its possessor's conscious life, where this difference is either a matter of really knowing what's happening or just a matter of being affected. The experience occurs where the person having the experience is, though not necessarily in the person's head. An experience depends on its subject, its grounding event or state, and everything that the subject is aware of during that time that's relevant to the telling of the story of how it was to participate in that event or be put in that state. The participants of an experience include the substances among these and the substances upon which the rest depend.
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